And the fact that they wanted to spend nothing on the software and then rush to production (this was exposed in this article) is some cluster-b antisocial personality disorder shit...The bean counters had the stock churning at all time highs and they were going to do things their own way (trading at 450 per share shortly before these tragedies).
So it's HIGHLY unlikely that Boeings software for the 737 Max would have been operating at spec given the use-case (overcoming hardware problems with software in a way that's never been done before). MCAS was not designed to take into account that external sesors could be out of wack (which happens all the time). MCAS took liberties and had opinions that ran counter to the norms of aviation. And this is the hallmark of poor software engineers that have no domain expertise and no ability to push back against anti-social personalities masquerading as managers.
"
When the two computers disagree, the solution for the humans in the cockpit is to look across the control panel to see what the other instruments are saying and then sort it out. In the Boeing system, the flight management computer does not “look across” at the other instruments. It believes only the instruments on its side. It doesn’t go old-school. It’s modern. It’s software.
This means that if a particular angle-of-attack sensor goes haywire—which happens all the time in a machine that alternates from one extreme environment to another, vibrating and shaking all the way—the flight management computer just believes it. "
If you want to have the title of SR. Engineer and lives are in the palm of your hand you better be prepared to be the bad guy and take on management when they're being driven by motivations that run counter towards the quality and the usecases for your code. VW had a similar culture and those "senior software engineers" went to prison, not the managers (remember that).
https://spectrum.ieee.org/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-lo...
And the fact that they wanted to spend nothing on the software and then rush to production (this was exposed in this article) is some cluster-b antisocial personality disorder shit...The bean counters had the stock churning at all time highs and they were going to do things their own way (trading at 450 per share shortly before these tragedies).
So it's HIGHLY unlikely that Boeings software for the 737 Max would have been operating at spec given the use-case (overcoming hardware problems with software in a way that's never been done before). MCAS was not designed to take into account that external sesors could be out of wack (which happens all the time). MCAS took liberties and had opinions that ran counter to the norms of aviation. And this is the hallmark of poor software engineers that have no domain expertise and no ability to push back against anti-social personalities masquerading as managers.
" When the two computers disagree, the solution for the humans in the cockpit is to look across the control panel to see what the other instruments are saying and then sort it out. In the Boeing system, the flight management computer does not “look across” at the other instruments. It believes only the instruments on its side. It doesn’t go old-school. It’s modern. It’s software.
This means that if a particular angle-of-attack sensor goes haywire—which happens all the time in a machine that alternates from one extreme environment to another, vibrating and shaking all the way—the flight management computer just believes it. "
If you want to have the title of SR. Engineer and lives are in the palm of your hand you better be prepared to be the bad guy and take on management when they're being driven by motivations that run counter towards the quality and the usecases for your code. VW had a similar culture and those "senior software engineers" went to prison, not the managers (remember that).