It describes interesting questions that were faced on the project: say, how much control over a lunar module could be given to a computer system, and how much they should rely on human engagement.
I read this book a couple years ago, it’s great. In fact, I picked up the book 2nd hand with a note from the author inscribed on a cover page. Neat.
This book is especially interesting to anyone building systems where humans are required to interface with a computer on a “mission-critical” level.
It goes in-depth about the new type of electrical component-integrated circuits used in the guidance system. And more about other aspects of the navigation systems used on Apollo.
It's interesting to me that 50+ years later this debate on system control is still very much relevant to aerospace today, like the recent 737-MAX issue.
My limited understanding in a broader sense (as opposed to the specific 737-MAX case) is there is still considerable debate on who should have ultimate control (human or software) of the aircraft when making critical decisions. I remember reading an article a while back that made it seem like Boeing and Airbus were on different sides of this spectrum in basic design philosophy, but I don't know how true that is.
It's like any good technical religious debate: both sides have good points and the ideal that they're both working toward is somewhere in the middle.
Airbus has backed off trying automate everything (starting with AF 296 in 1988) and, as this MCAS debacle has demonstrated, Boeing is happy to add serious automation. The days of the "pilot's plane" are long over. Now it's ever thinnner shades of gray.
It describes interesting questions that were faced on the project: say, how much control over a lunar module could be given to a computer system, and how much they should rely on human engagement.