>What you are claiming about European cops is also not uniformly true. A German police officer cannot "just" self-issue a search warrant.
Yes. The more worrying situation is that Hungary can just decide that their police officers can self-issue search warrants, and then send those around the EU in the form of EIOs.
"On 5 April 2018, the Oberlandesgericht (Higher State Court) in the German state of Schleswig-Holstein ruled that Puigdemont would not be extradited on charges of rebellion, and released him on bail while deliberating about the extradition on charges of misuse of public funds."
So, exactly as I wrote: The rebellion charge did not make sense to the court, so no extradition due to that. On the other hand they found that they could do something with the charges of misusing public funds (and thus needed longer to decide about it). If Spain had not dropped the EAW, Puigdemont's legal team would have had an opportunity to challenge any decisions of the court.
In general it is no fun if another EU country issues an EAW against you, but anything making no sense will be thrown out by the local EU country's courts and you have every chance to go against the decisions of the court.
That's rather rude of you, I did in fact read the entire text of the link.
I hate citing wikipedia, but if you'll skip forward a few lines, you'll find this nugget:
"On 12 July 2018 the higher court in Schleswig-Holstein confirmed that Puigdemont could not be extradited by the crime of rebellion, but may still be extradited based on charges of misuse of public funds"
Puigdemont would have almost certainly ended up extradited, but he would enjoy the EAW protections which would presumably not be desirable for the Spanish government.
It was not rude but a reasonable assumption. Let's revisit what we discussed:
>>Usually LE in European countries will not respect warrants from another country if it does not make sense in the local jurisdiction as well.
>
>This is incorrect and goes explicitly against the intent of the relevant frameworks.
But in the link you could clearly see that the court dismissed the EAW on charges of rebellion. If Spain had only issued the EAW based on this charge, or if Spain had issued two separate EAW for the separate charges, this is clearly showing what I was claiming.
What you have cited only confirms what I was writing earlier - if it makes sense to the court they might follow-up with the EAW. I am not sure at all, though, how you come to the conclusion that Puigdemont "almost certainly" would have ended up extradited. It is not given that the court would have found the charges valid and there are all legal means available to challenge the court's decision.
But even if he had been extradited due to the charges of misusing public funds, whatever is wrong with that? There are extradition treaties between many countries and that would be an absolutely valid case for extradition, if the charges make sense in the local jurisdiction. Should every criminal be safe as soon as they are crossing a border?
The important thing is that a court is checking the charges and that there is legal recourse, before any extradition.
So, in summary I feel not threatened at all by the existence of those instruments in the EU and you failed to make me understand why I should. The chance of an abuse of power or unjust persecution in any single country (EU or not) is so much larger than a scenario where this happens in two countries at the same time.
However, this is a bit exhausting, so I am done with this discussion.
>It was not rude but a reasonable assumption. Let's revisit what we discussed:
Yeah, variations of "did you even read the link" are rude. Yours was perhaps particularly aggressive.
>But in the link you could clearly see that the court dismissed the EAW on charges of rebellion. If Spain had only issued the EAW based on this charge, or if Spain had issued two separate EAW for the separate charges, this is clearly showing what I was claiming.
"Another important advantage of the EAW compared to extradition proceedings is that for 32 categories of offences, there is no verification on whether the act constitutes a criminal offence in both countries. The only requirement is that the offence needs to be punishable by a maximum period of at least 3 years of imprisonment in the issuing Member State."
The dual criminality check does not apply to most crimes. It did apply in the basically unique case of "rebellion", but the EAW largely did away with dual criminality checks.
>It is not given that the court would have found the charges valid and there are all legal means available to challenge the court's decision.
There are no meaningful legal means to challenge the validity of the charges in the EAW process, the entire point of the process is to skip that. You get to challenge the validity of the charges after you've been extradited and brought in front of the courts of the requesting country.
>But even if he had been extradited due to the charges of misusing public funds, whatever is wrong with that?
Specifically in Puigdemonts case I do not wish him extradited as I doubt he would be treated respectfully in Spain. But his case is obviously one-of-a-kind.
>There are extradition treaties between many countries and that would be an absolutely valid case for extradition, if the charges make sense in the local jurisdiction. Should every criminal be safe as soon as they are crossing a border?
EAW is completely different from regular extradition treaties.
>The important thing is that a court is checking the charges and that there is legal recourse, before any extradition.
The whole purpose of EAW has been to get rid of as much legal recourse as possible, and over time various CJEU decisions have been further eroding practices some national courts had established.
>you failed to make me understand why I should
You'll probably receive better replies in the future if you avoid the unnecessary personal attacks.
In ERP software there are MLOCs without any technical documentation. And nobody would spend a dime to create one. So, the deep expert knowledge on how business processes are supposed to work (in full detail) and how they are implemented is mostly in the heads of a couple of people.
AI is most excellent at reading and understanding large codebases and, with some guidance docs, can easily reproduce accurate technical documentation. Divide and conquer.
Reading a large codebase...perhaps if it is not too large. Understanding... why a tool exists, what is the motivation for its design, what the external human systems requirements for successful utilization of the internal facing tools... especially when that knowledge exists only in the memories of a few developers and PMs... not so much.
Deep domain expertise is a long way from AI capability for effective replacement.
Again, nobody would spend a dime to create the technical documentation, even if it could be done somewhat faster with AI support. Also, in my experience AI is not so great explaining the consequences to business processes when documenting code.
Accuracy/faithfulness to the code as written isn't necessarily what you care about though, it's an understanding of the underlying problem. Just translating code doesn't actually help you do that.
> They're really good at curb-stomping much weaker opponents, like [..] Iran
That remains to be seen, though. Really winning that war requires either lots of boots on the ground and a long occupation (where the outcome might still be like in Afghanistan) or using nukes, which could escalate quite badly for us all. There is a reason no other POTUS has attacked Iran before.
Of course Trump can at every point in time just declare victory and leave the mess to all others for cleaning up. That is the most likely outcome, IMHO.
>>I imagine there could be regulation to force vendors keeping their old cars repairable.
Yes, but what does that mean in practice? That Manufacturer has to keep making parts for 20 years after production ends? How does that help if your entire infotainment system runs on Google's AOSS system and google just pulls the plug on it or the built-in modem stops connecting to the internet because your country decided to switch off all 3G networks(which is a real problem happening everywhere). Is the car "working" but with all apps and satnav completely blank still functional or does it need "repair" - if so, what does that repair even look like?
As a basic example - I have a 2020 Volvo XC60 with Sensus OS - all the maps are preloaded on the internal drive and they will continue working until the hardware breaks - they might get outdated but they will work. But I drove a new Volvo XC60 with AOSS and I was in the area without any signal coverage - in that case all the maps were just blank, the middle of the driver display was blank, it literally looked broken because nothing would load and the screens didn't have a good fallback for such a scenario.....which will inevitably happen to all these cars, either because they lose connectivity or because google/volvo decide to stop supporting them on their network.
You mean, ensuring repairability would be hard? I bet. And exceptions could be made where a change of technology makes aspects of the car non-functional (3G vanishing). On the other hand, the choice of contractors/suppliers, contracts with those entities, and so on would work differently with a repairability law in place.
Both the governments and the manufacturer benefit from you driving a newer vehicle instead of keeping your old car running. Topics like environmental impact safety etc. are higher priority compared to repair-ability. Additionally most people don't care.
Additionally there is the issue of licensing and regulation around the hardware and software of a vehicle. The regulation in my country is written around "type approval" and this means you can not change the car significantly beyond what is approved during the car "type approval" process.
On top of that this market is ripe for abuse of planned obsolescence as the product is very technically complex and there is no real regulation against it.
This is why I drive an old car and a simple modern car, most modern smart tv's with wheels strapped to them will become bricked the moment the manufacturer doesn't support them anymore (after the 10year lifespan).
In my experience, it does actually work. Tesla model s had an issue with the flash memory endurance, and the NHTSA made them replace it. Which they did, and upgraded the 3G modem to LTE while they were at it. My 2013 Model S is still going strong, still gets software updates.
They forced them to replace it because it was recognized as a manufacturing/design defect. This is a very different scenario from "normal wear" replacement.
Additionally the Tesla model S is still in production with only a facelift. Therefore the parts that are produced are not unavailable (or not supplied).
I think you can't replace/upgrade the flash and modem yourself without the assistance of a Tesla dealer.
> Similar to how other large military purchases are less about the military hardware and more of a client state subscription to ‘align interests’ such that the US is more likely to act in the donor countries interest.
I have a feeling this is no longer a viable model. If "subscribers" get threatened every other day, they will be looking for alternatives.
So long as not subscribing is worse than subscribing countries will still do it. Even if it not in the interest of the country the decision makers can and do still get kickbacks / speaking engagements.
It’s interesting to read of the ineffectiveness of influence the gulf states thought they had, though I think that speaks more to the relative cost effectiveness of tributes versus blackmail. These states don’t have the security apparatus to both blackmail US politicians and prevent others from blackmailing those same politicians. This second part is essential as it is what maintains the relative advantage.
I do think they will be less enthusiastic subscribers in the future, and perhaps even shop around for more cost effective approaches. Modi in India is intentionally creating an Indian diaspora as one example and I believe he is bribing politicians to help make this happen.
> read of the ineffectiveness of influence the gulf states thought they had
The primary players in the Gulf - Saudi and the UAE - have been aligned with the ongoing Iran strikes.
KSA's Mohammad Bin Salman has been lobbying Trump to strike Iran [0], just like his predecessor King Abdullah was doing [1]. Similarly, the UAE has an ongoing land dispute with Iran [2].
2. The operationalization of the Iran-Central Asia-China railway in 2025 [0], which allows China to bypass Malacca
3. Iran's relative weakness following the collapse of the Assad regime, the death of much od Hezbollah's leadership, and the Houthis comparative weakness
4. Continued anger amongst policymakers in the Gulf, Israel, and the US that Iran-backed Hamas launched the 10/7 attack barely 3 weeks after the US+EU launched the IMEC project and were about to loop Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords [1]
I was hoping to hear the case made as to why Israel was not the primary reason but instead you seem to have chosen to elide it altogether. It seems to be a conspicuous omission especially when both the US and Israeli admin have repeatedly made the case that Israel was the primary reason.
Primary reason is because Israel and American zionists (mostly evangelical christians) lobby for it. The KSA and friends also lobbying for it is just icing on the cake for American politicians.
China also views the EU as a junior partner [0], is running an ongoing disinfo campaign against the industrial exports of an EU member state [1], and has doubled down on it's support for Russia [2] in Ukraine in return for Russia backing China's claim on Taiwan [3].
And the EU is uninterested in building domestic capacity for most critical technologies.
Heck, last week [4] the EU excluded AI, Quantum, Semiconductors, and other technologies from the Industrial Accelerator Act (aka the "Made in EU" act) in order to concentrate on automotive and "net-zero" technologies.
Given that Chinese technology imports are already under the radar in the EU due to the Ukraine war, this is basically the EU creating a carveout for the US.
Even the major European Telecom and Space companies like Eutelsat, Deutsche Telekom, and Telefónica bluntly stated that they view the EU's digital sovereignity strategy as dead in the water [5] in it's current form.
Edit: can't reply
> They/we will go to domestic producers as much as possible, then China, then US, then rest of the world in that order. At least that would make a rational approach since (for now) unique things like f-35 can become an expensive paperweight on a whim of a lonely sick man. You can't build any sort of defense strategy on that, can you
But as I clearly showed, the EU is doing otherwise.
And the EU cannot work with China as long as China backs Russia and undermines European industrial exports.
All the rhetoric about digital sovereignity and domestic capacity has been just that - rhetoric.
They/we will go to domestic producers as much as possible, then China, then US, then rest of the world in that order. At least that would make a rational approach since (for now) unique things like f-35 can become an expensive paperweight on a whim of a lonely sick man. You can't build any sort of defense strategy on that, can you.
> And the EU cannot work with China as long as China backs Russia and undermines European industrial exports.
I mean, that is not that huge a difference compared to the USA (lifting sanctions against Russia, no tariffs there either, but plenty tariffs for "allies"; threatening NATO members in several ways; taking over Russia's "peace" plans for Ukraine 1:1 and putting the pressure solely on Ukraine; (I could go on for pages)).
I am not sure Americans really understand how much trust is already gone.
> that is not that huge a difference compared to the USA
It is for the EU.
The EU dislikes the current deprioritization of the Ukraine Conflict by the US, but also recognizes that the PRC is directly providing material support and subsidizing Russia's military industrial complex [0]. That is the red line for much of the EU.
Similarly, for the PRC it's continued support of Russia in their war in Ukraine is also a non-negotiatable [1], and the CCP's foreign mouthpieces continue to reiterate that "the mainstay of EU foreign policy — supporting Ukraine in a conflict to defeat Russia — has turned into a quagmire of sunk costs with little hope of success" [2].
> I am not sure Americans really understand how much trust is already gone
We know. And we don't care.
As long as the EU views Ukraine's territorial integrity as non-negotiable and a large portion of EU states view Russia as the primary national security threat, the US will remain the less bad option than the PRC or Russia.
Both the US and China are aligned in that we view the EU as a junior party that can be pressured [3].
If the EU views Russia as a threat, it will have to accept American vassalage becuase the PRC will continue to back Russia [1].
If the EU views America as a threat, it will have to accept Chinese vassalage, give up Ukraine, and accept Russia as the primary European military power.
Based on the carveouts within the Industrial Acceleration Act, the EU has chosen American vassalage.
Very bold words. I am not even convinced the USA will stay relevant on the world stage, in the long run. Cutting ties hurts, but the process is underway. Also, "vassalage" is a bold word, if the US cannot make the EU give up Greenland or come running to help them in the Strait of Hormuz (there are also other examples). It is almost as if European politicians are playing it smart.
And my question is - are you fine sacrificing Ukraine in return for a Russian and Chinese military umbrella? This is the hard requirement for China to engage with the EU [0].
The answer in Poland, the Baltics, Czechia, and Finland is NO and that Russia is worse and that Ukraine must be supported, and will back the US no matter how transactional we become.
The answer in Hungary, Slovakia, and Belgium [1] is YES and that sacrificing Ukraine for Russia is acceptable.
> if the Chinese support for Russia can be broken, by economical incentive...
China is not interested in breaking with Russia.
Russia helps China put pressure on Japan [0], helps China put pressure on South Korea [1], allows China to expand it's influence in Central Asia [2], acts as a backchannel for China-India diplomatic normalization [3], gives China the ability to access ONG without dealing with Hormuz or Malaccas [4], and allows China to run the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe railway [5] which continues to supply Europe with no sanctions despite the ongoing war in Ukraine.
On the other hand, the EU is tariffing Chinese goods [6]; signing FTAs with Chinese rivals like India [7], Japan [8], and South Korea [9]; and signing defense pacts with Japan [10], South Korea [11], and India [12] while allowing them to participate in ReArm Europe 2030.
Additionally, China-EU trade only represents a little over 10% of all Chinese trade [13], and is easily replaceable with expanded trade with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, and India.
China views Russia the same way America views the EU - a weak junior partner who can be bullied. The US is somewhat trying to pull Russia to our side, and China is somewhat trying to pull the EU to their side, but the reality is both the US and China view the EU and Russia as junior partners.
> the Chinese support for Russia can be broken, by ... threat
What threat can the EU give to China? Chinese foreign policy already views the EU as sanctimonious [14], weak [15], and declining [16].
> over short or long the EU needs to build its own military to a strength it can at least work as a strong deterrence for aggressors
Yep.
But that will takes decades, which is why the US and China can both bully the EU with complete impunity today.
Heck, both China [17] and the US under Trump [18] are supporting Viktor Orban because he is a great Trojan horse.
Whenever either the US or China feels the EU is leaning towards one at the expense of the other, they then start breaking EU institutions as a result.
You have a very static view there. In my estimation the US is on the way down, at least economically/financially. Their internal stability is already somewhat broken. It will be hard to continue to project power without real allies and the internal issues they have and will have.
So, if the EU is so much inferior, why did they not buckle in the Greenland issue, but Trump was called back by his puppeteers? Why can they say "no" to supporting the US and Israel against Iran? And if they wanted the EU leaders could go further and match tariffs one by one and nothing serious would happen. The picture you are painting does not account for the facts. The relationship is not between equals but lord and vassal is also not a good fit.
I am not sure about the trade figures in your link [13]. It does not open for me. I seem to recall a significantly higher export volume going to Europe. But anyway, China is going to have their own internal issues with an aging populace, an end to strong economical growth and ever-growing social inequality. They are also too rational (compared to the US) to disrupt good business by mutual bullying (at least overtly and systematically).
What threat can the EU give to China? Chinese foreign policy already views the EU as sanctimonious [14], weak [15], and declining [16].
15 is an opinion piece written by a failed politician from Kyrgyzstan for China Daily and 16 is another opinion piece written by a right-wing politician from Slovakia. Neither represent Chinese opinions. 14 doesn't open for me.
The message matters less than the messenger - China Daily is the English language newspaper of the CCP's Propaganda Department and the Global Times is the English language newspaper of the CCP's Central Committee.
The fact that the mouthpieces of two of the CCP's most important committees are constantly publishing content that is dismissive of the EU highlights how China's leadership actually views Europe.
Europeans really need to get it in their head that both the US and China look at the EU dismissively and as a junior partner. Neither the US nor China is interested in a relationship of equals with the EU.
I think GP's point is more relevant than your question implies. The vast majority of civilian flights could be flown entirely autonomously right now. (I'm not close enough to the aviation industry to make a confident guess, but +90% wouldn't surprise me.) Humans are there to take (decision or control) over when something goes off the happy path - in fact, pilots are encouraged / required to hand-fly landings that could be done automatically in order to keep their skills current. Obviously no one would accept even a 0.01% crash rate for civilian flights, so we're many orders of magnitude of improvement away from replacing pilots in that sector.
Military calculations are very different. Every military asset - most definitely including humans - is disposable, and all wars are (in some dimension) wars of attrition. Holding mission success constant, when the cost x capability x ability to manufacture for autonomous platforms becomes cheaper than all that plus training / replacement cost of human pilots, then human pilots will disappear. The logic of war being what it is, I expect HITL decision-making to very quickly be dropped as soon as it is seen to be retarding the progress of a cheaper option.
That's true. It'd be more accurate to say that the planes are capable, but that a lot about how the air transport system is organized would have to change to take full advantage of that - which we don't want/need to do, because an "automatic" system is too brittle, so we'd want skilled pilots on board, anyway.
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