The universe is not obligated to appeal to your aesthetic tastes in its innermost functioning.
Maybe you aren’t going to be satisfied with the sort of complicated mathematics which appears to be correct (or, on the right track).
If you have complaints about the aesthetics of how the universe works, take it up with God.
Personally, I think there is a lot of beauty to be found in it.
I’ll admit that there are a few parts that go against my tastes (I don’t like needing to resort to distributions instead of proper functions), but that’s probably just intellectual laziness on my part.
> The universe is not obligated to appeal to your aesthetic tastes in its innermost functioning.
This is truly a copout. When science faulters in explaining the world we get answers like this. His argument isnt with the universe, but with out own scientific theories. If you dont want your theories about the physical world to explain physical world, then be an engineer. Science explains the world, engineers use those theories. QM has large gaps and doesnt actually explain much, but I guess the universe doesnt care whether our theories are wildly off the mark or not.
It's not a matter of taste. This is like going to a restaurant, expecting a delicious meal, and being brought a dish with a fancy name made out of the actual menu itself. Would anyone go back there to eat?
Systems can hypothesize about themselves but they cannot determine why the rules they can learn exist in the first place. Prior states are no longer observable so there is always incomplete history.
Conway's Game of Life can't explain its own origins just itself. Because the origins are no longer observable after they occur.
What are the origins of our universe? We can only guess without the specificity of direct observation. Understanding is incomplete with only simulation and theory.
So the comment is right. We would expect to be able to define what is now but not completely know what came before.
like, the part where they get a_i log p_i ,
well, the sum of this over i is gives the number,
but it seemed like they were treating this as… a_i being a random variable associated to p_i , or something? I wasn’t really clear on what they were doing with that.
Take an $n$, chosen from $[N,2N]$. Take it's prime factorization $n = \prod_{j=1}^{k} q_j^{a_j}$. Take the logarithm $\log(n) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} a_j \log(q_j)$.
Divide by $\log(n)$ to get the sum equal to $1$ and then define a weight term $w _ j = a_j \log(q_j)/\log(n)$.
Think of $w_j$ as "probabilities". We can define an entropy of sorts as $H_{factor}(n) = - \sum_j w_j \log(w_j)$.
Heuristics (such as Poisson-Dirichlet) suggest this converges to 1 as $N \to \infty$.
OpenAI tells me that the reason this might be interesting is that it's giving information on whether a typical integer is built from one, or a few, dominant prime(s) or many smaller ones. A mean entropy of 1 is saying (apparently) that there is a dominant prime factor but not an overwhelming one. (I guess) a mean to 0 means dominant prime, mean to infinity means many small factors (?) and oscillations mean no stable structure.
Ok, how about "a pile of linear algebra [that is vastly simpler and more limited than systems we know about in nature which do experience or appear to experience subjective reality]"?
> If that were the case, we would only really love the games we grew up with.
I’m not sure that’s true? Like, perhaps the preference might generalize from the several games one did play as a child to other games which are similar to the ones one played as a child, with the preference still being a result of which games one played as a child.
Utilitarianism, for example, is not (necessarily) relativistic, and would (for pretty much all utility functions that people propose) endorse lying in some situations.
Moral realism doesn’t mean that there are no general principles that are usually right about what is right and wrong but have some exceptions. It means that for at least some cases, there is a fact of the matter as to whether a given act is right or wrong.
It is entirely compatible with moral realism to say that lying is typically immoral, but that there are situations in which it may be morally obligatory.
I think you are interpreting “absolute” in a different way?
I’m not the top level commenter, but my claim is that there are moral facts, not that in every situation, the morally correct behavior is determined by simple rules such as “Never lie.”.
(Also, even in the case of Kant’s argument about that case, his argument isn’t that you must let him in, or even that you must tell him the truth, only that you mustn’t lie to the axe murderer. Don’t make a straw man. He does say it is permissible for you to kill the axe murderer in order to save the life of your friend.
I think Kant was probably incorrect in saying that lying to the axe murderer is wrong, and in such a situation it is probably permissible to lie to the axe murderer. Unlike most forms of moral anti-realism, moral realism allows one to have uncertainty about what things are morally right.
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I would say that if a person believes that in the situation they find themselves in, that a particular act is objectively wrong for them to take, independent of whether they believe it to be, and if that action is not in fact morally obligatory or supererogatory, and the person is capable (in some sense) of not taking that action, then it is wrong for that person to take that action in that circumstance.
An RT is visible in the feed when following someone. Public likes are visible when going to their account and viewing their list of likes. (When they put both in the feed, it’s just dumb.)
Private likes are different from bookmarks in that it shows how many likes the post got, but not the number of bookmarks.
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